

Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943¹

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Macrolevel theories of social movement emergence posit that political opportunity “opens the door” for collective action. This article uses the case of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising to show that collective action need not always require opportunity. Warsaw Jews’ armed resistance was a response not to opportunity but to a lack thereof. Equally important was a strong sense of honor among the ghetto fighters: the hopelessness of their situation helped construct a motivational frame that equated resistance with honor and made collective resistance possible. This case therefore illustrates how framing processes can mediate structural conditions to produce collective action in the absence of opportunity. It also points to the need for additional research on protest and resistance in nondemocratic settings.

INTRODUCTION

While the tragedy of the Holocaust is well known, some common perceptions about it are inaccurate. The haunting Holocaust images with which many people are familiar typically portray the Nazis’ victims, especially Jews, as individuals who submitted meekly to their fate by going

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to the slaughter “like sheep.” Such depictions have prompted many commentators to ask, “Why didn’t the Jews resist?” Others respond to such questions by pointing out that European Jews did resist in a variety of ways, ranging from individual escapes to collective armed rebellions (see Bauer 1989, 2001; Marrus 1989).

Yet while these acts of resistance may help dispel the myth of Jewish passivity, they still leave important questions unanswered. In fact, from the perspective of macrolevel theory and research on social movements, collective Jewish resistance during the Holocaust is more problematic than inaction would have been. One dominant explanatory factor among these theories is the notion of “political opportunity,” a set of various features of the political climate thought to “open the door” for protest to occur. However, given a context in which Jews were isolated, politically powerless, and targeted for extermination by a powerful regime, opportunity-based explanations would argue that collective acts of Jewish resistance never should have happened at all. This prediction sets the stage for the following analysis. Instead of asking, “Why didn’t Jews resist?” I ask “Why *did* Jews resist?”

My inquiry focuses on a single case: the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943. In January and April 1943,² coalitions of Jewish activists in the Warsaw Ghetto used a small arsenal of smuggled weapons and homemade explosives to resist the Nazis’ attempts to deport them to the death camp Treblinka. This case is of substantial importance to the study of social movements for two reasons. First, it extends current theory and research to a new terrain. As scholars are increasingly recognizing the limitations of a research literature based mainly on the study of protest in contemporary Western democracies (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), an analysis of collective resistance that took place in a nondemocratic context during World War II offers a useful test of the applicability of dominant theoretical concepts to a broader range of cases. Second, as stated above, this case presents an important challenge to one of the explanatory factors offered by these theories; namely, the concept of political opportunity. The dire conditions in the Warsaw Ghetto, along with the sheer strength of the Nazi regime, Poland’s widespread anti-Semitism, and Jews’ segregation from the rest of Polish society, severely restricted opportunities for collective action. An examination of the emergence of collective resistance under conditions that would seem to preclude it therefore helps clarify the relationship between

² The first uprising lasted only a few days, while the second lasted from April 19 until the destruction of the ghetto in mid-May. The ghetto revolts are distinct from the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, a citywide uprising against the Nazis staged mainly by non-Jewish Poles.

opportunity and action and furthers our understanding of the dynamics of protest and resistance.

Below, I argue that collective action in the Warsaw Ghetto emerged not in response to opportunity but to a lack thereof; in fact, it was only once the ghetto fighters became aware of the hopelessness of their situation that they began to plan for resistance. Opportunity and constraint cannot explain this case completely, however. The ghetto residents' assessment of their situation as one in which their deaths were inevitable facilitated the construction of a motivational frame that equated resistance with honor and dignity. This case therefore shows how framing processes can compel action in the absence of opportunity, real or perceived.

I begin with a more detailed discussion of the concept of political opportunity and its role in the emergence of collective action. Then, drawing on secondary sources as well as on primary data in the form of diaries and memoirs written by ghetto residents, I describe life in the Warsaw Ghetto between 1940 and 1943. My empirical discussion centers on the emergence of armed resistance in the ghetto and is therefore focused more on the events preceding the uprising than on the resistance itself. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of this case study for future theory and research on contentious politics in a variety of settings.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT EMERGENCE: THE "CLASSICAL AGENDA" AND MORE RECENT FORMULATIONS

Classical treatments of the role of political opportunity in collective action include political process theory (McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978) and work on the concept of "political opportunity structures" (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Schock 1999; Tarrow 1994, 1996). This research explains movement emergence in terms of various aspects of the broader political context in which insurgency takes place. Although "political opportunity" has come to mean a number of different things, including features of the electoral system, elite alliances, policy changes, and state repression, the concept generally refers to some restructuring of power relations that creates an "opening" for protest to occur (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996). Similarly, research on revolutions points to state crises and conflict between states and elites as factors that make revolutions possible (Goldstone 1986, 1991; Goldstone and Useem 1999; Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979; Skocpol and Trimberger 1986). Explanations like these are part of what McAdam et al. (2001) describe as the "classical social movement agenda."

While much of this theoretical work is focused at the macro level, some scholars also emphasize protesters' subjective interpretation of their cir-

cumstances, arguing that protesters must be *aware* of opportunity in order for facilitative environmental factors to translate into collective action. In a well-known quote, McAdam notes (1982, p. 48), “Mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations.” Although he first made this claim in 1982, expressly synthetic treatments of macro- and microassessments of opportunity—what McAdam et al. (2001) refer to as “the attribution of opportunity”—are more common among recent theoretical discussions of social movement emergence. Some of this work even suggests that participants’ optimistic assessments may, in some cases, counteract structural limitations. For example, when describing the process by which activists “frame” or make sense of opportunity, Gamson and Meyer (1996, p. 285) argue that activists “systematically overestimate the degree of political opportunity” in order to convince others to join their cause, and that “by influencing perceptions of opportunity among potential activists, organizers can actually alter the material bases of opportunity” (p. 286). Similarly, C. Kurzman’s (1996) analysis of the 1979 Iranian revolution argues that although a strong Iranian state precluded structural opportunity, the Iranian people still perceived opportunity to exist; their belief that the opposition movement was poised to succeed facilitated their participation and the government’s eventual overthrow. These scholars therefore suggest that protesters’ abilities to create opportunity—even if only in their own minds—can facilitate collective action.

Finally, although the concept of opportunity has been used widely and has received a great deal of empirical support, opportunity-based explanations for the emergence of collective action are not without their critics. Goodwin and Jasper (1999), who provide perhaps the most explicit of these criticisms, suggest that opportunity need not always result in collective action. Citing research that has found, for example, that state repression (generally thought to indicate a lack of political opportunity) can in some situations actually facilitate protest, they conclude that the effect of this factor “is not invariant, but historically and situationally contingent” (p. 38). Goodwin (2001) also puts forth a “state constructionist” theory of revolutions, which argues that high levels of state repression may help construct or “incubate” revolution by justifying action against the state and reinforcing the belief that there is “no other way out.” Similarly, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) suggest that situations of extreme threat—a factor they see as existing separately from opportunity—can facilitate collective action. In their view, “threat” refers to the costs associated with action (or nonaction). They therefore argue that collective action can occur in the absence of opportunity, if the costs of inaction are perceived to be great.

My inquiry is grounded in and provides empirical support for Goldstone

and Tilly's argument, as well as for Goodwin and Jasper's critique and the theoretical discussions of the interplay between structural opportunity and the perceptions of such. As I explain in more detail below, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising took place despite a lack of opportunity, real or perceived. In fact, collective resistance emerged precisely *because* Jews recognized there was no way out of the ghetto. This awareness helped create collective action by allowing a particular motivational frame (Benford 1993) to take hold: one that equated resistance with honor. An analysis of this case therefore goes beyond recent discussions of structural and perceived opportunity to show how framing processes can facilitate collective action even in the absence of political opportunity. It also suggests that some of those contingencies to which Goodwin and Jasper refer can include genocide and the belief among participants that their deaths are inevitable, contingencies that fit Goldstone and Tilly's concept of threat. Finally, as I explain in the conclusion, this case points to the need for empirical research on a greater variety of cases—especially those in situations of extreme powerlessness—to continue to refine our understanding of the emergence of collective action.

CASE SELECTION AND DATA

Protest and resistance can take many forms (Jasper 1997, p. 5; see also Pichardo Almanzar, Sullivan-Catlin, and Deane 1998; Scott 1990). Correspondingly, European Jews resisted the Nazis in many different ways. Individual acts of resistance included going into hiding, escaping from camps and transports, "passing" as Gentiles, sabotaging goods made in factories, burying and destroying valuables rather than allowing them to be confiscated, and even committing suicide (Appleman-Jurman 1988; Bauman 1986; Klajman 2000; Melson 2000). In the Warsaw Ghetto, similar acts of individual resistance were noted; in addition, residents set up schools for children and continued to observe religious holidays, despite a ban on these practices (Gutman 1982; Syrkin 1948). Some in the ghetto were even more openly defiant of Nazi rules. For example, Wladyslaw Szpilman, a Warsaw Jew who survived the ghetto, describes in his memoirs how he and his brother risked beatings by refusing to obey the rule requiring all Jewish men to bow and doff their caps to passing German soldiers (Szpilman 1999, p. 49); other men went hatless, even in winter, to evade this law (Gutman 1994, p. 125). While such individual acts of resistance are notable, my analysis focuses on collective Jewish resistance because it falls within the domain of social movement theory, whereas individual acts do not.

The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was not the only example of collective

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Jewish resistance during the Holocaust; Jews also staged uprisings in other ghettos, as well as in concentration camps, and they joined with non-Jews in broader resistance movements throughout Europe (see Grubsztein 1971; Marrus 1989). However, the Warsaw case is worthy of study for several reasons. First, this case is of great symbolic importance as the best-known example of collective Jewish resistance against the Nazis; indeed, Poznanski (1995) refers to the Warsaw case as the “paradigm of Jewish resistance” (p. 128). It is also notable that Israel’s national day of Holocaust remembrance, Yom Hashoah, is held on the day recognized as the anniversary of the uprising (Gutman 1994, p. 259).³ Second, the case is quite well documented, more so than most other cases of collective Jewish resistance. A large array of data, such as writings contained in diaries and letters that were recovered from the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto, allow historians and other scholars to produce a number of secondary sources. This paper is part of a broader analysis that draws on secondary sources, as well as on primary data from the famous Oneg Shabbat archives and from published diaries and memoirs written by Warsaw Ghetto residents.⁴

My description of the ghetto and uprising is not meant to be historically exhaustive (for more detailed accounts, see Ainsztein [1979], Gutman [1982, 1994], and D. Kurzman [1993]). Instead, I use this case to illustrate how collective action can take place in the absence of political opportunity. Whereas C. Kurzman (1996) argues that studies of opportunity are best served by analyses of “mismatched” cases, or those whose levels of structural opportunity do not match participants’ perceptions of opportunity, my analysis focuses on a case with “matched” levels of opportunity. However, I argue that an examination of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is useful to social movement studies because it represents a case of collective action that took place despite a lack of opportunity—real or perceived—and therefore runs counter to what most research predicts.

Finally, although I present a single case, my analysis is implicitly com-

³ The April 1943 uprising actually began on the first day of Passover, the fifteenth day of the month of Nisan in the Jewish calendar. Yom Hashoah is the twenty-seventh of Nisan, but is recognized as the anniversary of the uprising.

⁴ The Oneg Shabbat archives, which contain underground newspapers, letters, and diaries, as well as reports on ghetto life, were organized by Emmanuel Ringelblum, a historian and ghetto resident who perished in 1944. The term *Oneg Shabbat* literally means “joy of the sabbath” and refers to a celebration held at the end of Sabbath services. During the time of the ghetto, when political meetings were expressly forbidden, Ringelblum and his archive workers used Oneg Shabbat as a code term for their activities. The materials they collected were placed in milk cans and buried in several locations in the ghetto. Although only a portion of the original archives survived, those that have been recovered are still invaluable for describing life in the ghetto (Gutman 1989a).

parative; it employs what Bonnell (1980) calls an “illustrative” use of comparison, which “focuses on correspondences between a unit or units of analysis and a theory or concept” (p. 171). I also use this case to speculate that the factors that facilitated the emergence of collective resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto may also operate in other contexts. At the same time, however, I recognize that there is much debate about the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the extent to which it may be compared to other settings (see Bauer 2001; Gerson 2001; Melson 1992; Rosenbaum 2001). Some scholars (e.g., Katz 2001; Lipstadt 1993) argue that the Holocaust is incomparable and unique, whereas others (e.g., Melson 1992, 2001) believe that it may be compared to other cases. My position is more in line with the latter group of scholars, most of whom undertake comparative studies of genocide. To their work, I add that collective resistance during the Holocaust may be compared to collective resistance in other contexts. However, by taking this position, I do not mean to diminish in any way the profound tragedy of the Holocaust. I argue simply that the fact that resistance happened under such unparalleled conditions is of great importance to the study of collective action and may help to enhance our understanding of protest and resistance in other settings.

THE WARSAW GHETTO, 1940–43

Following Germany’s infamous blitzkrieg invasion in September 1939, Poland was divided into three sections. The eastern region became Russian territory, while the two remaining sections were occupied by Germany. Of these, the northern and western regions became part of the Reich, and the remaining territory—which included Warsaw—became known as the “General Government” (Gutman 1982, pp. 10–12).

Although Hitler’s “Final Solution” for European Jews had not yet been codified, Jews living in the General Government were still subject to Nazi repression from the beginning of the occupation. Jews were forbidden to own businesses or work in certain occupations (usually traditionally Jewish occupations, such as textile work); they also had to obey curfews and were not allowed to possess certain valuables (e.g., furs). After December 1, 1939, each Jew in the General Government over the age of 10 was also required to display his or her Jewish identity in the form of a white armband imprinted with a blue Star of David (Gutman 1982, p. 29). In addition to these formalized edicts, Jews were frequently beaten on the streets, rounded up for forced labor, and coerced at gunpoint to perform humiliating acts such as dancing naked or cleaning officers’ quarters using their own undergarments as cleaning cloths. Religious Jewish men were particular targets of Nazi brutality and often had their beards cut, burned,

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or torn from their faces (Ainsztein 1979; Donat 1978; Gutman 1982, 1994; Klajman 2000).

By the end of September 1939, the Nazis also began planning for the ghettoization of Polish Jews. In accordance with Nazi ideology, the Reich was to be *judenfrei* or *judenrein* (free of Jews); therefore, Polish Jews living in the region that had been annexed by Germany were either murdered or deported to the General Government. Within the General Government, Jews from the countryside and smaller towns were relocated to the larger cities where they were ghettoized, or forcibly segregated from the rest of the Polish population and confined to sealed (i.e., walled-off) areas.⁵ The Warsaw Ghetto was decreed on October 12, 1940, and sealed a month later, on November 16 (Gutman 1982, 1994).

Life in the Ghetto

The end of 1940 found Warsaw Jews confined to a 1.36-square-mile area that was surrounded by a 10-foot wall topped with barbed wire and broken glass (Ainsztein 1979; Gutman 1994; D. Kurzman 1993). Within the ghetto there was considerable crowding. About 30% of the city's population was forced to reside in 2.4% of the city's area (Gutman 1982, p. 60), and when the ghetto population reached its peak of 500,000 in the summer of 1941, average per room occupancy was 13 (D. Kurzman 1993). With crowding came disease. Typhus, a disease spread by lice, was a particular problem. Szpilman's memoirs described how he was met nightly by his mother "with a bowl of spirits and pair of pincers" to remove and destroy lice that he picked up during the day (1999, pp. 18–19), and Janina Bauman, who was interred in the ghetto with her family as a teenager, wrote, "Physical contact with strangers was what we tried most to avoid. . . . The homeless, tattered, undernourished people we brushed against in the streets were covered with lice and often suffered from infectious diseases" (1986, p. 40).

Cut off from their jobs and traditional ways of earning a living, most ghetto residents had quite limited means; further, with official food rations estimated at less than 300 calories per day (D. Kurzman 1993, p. 23), hunger was widespread. The memoirs of Adina Szwajger, a physician in the ghetto, describe her staff's efforts to feed their hospital patients; sometimes all they could provide was an injection of glucose solution (1990, pp. 31–32). Beggars were everywhere, and it became typical to see starving people lying in the street. As time wore on, the sight of corpses (sometimes naked or covered with paper because their clothing was valuable to surviving relatives) became commonplace. Some of the more desperate beg-

⁵ Gutman (1994, p. 51) lists ghettos in 53 Polish cities.

gars became *khappers* or “snatchers” who grabbed food away from others on the street and ingested it before they could be caught (Gutman 1982; D. Kurzman 1993). Others turned to smuggling as a means of survival.⁶ Typically, children were the best smugglers; because of their size and agility, they were able to fit through small holes in the ghetto walls and were more adept than adults at evading guards. However, such activity was not without costs. Jack Klajman, who was a 10-year-old boy in Warsaw in 1941, described the actions of a German guard known as “Frankenstein” in his memoirs:⁷

He guarded the area in a jeep with a mounted machine gun. As children would climb the wall, Frankenstein and a German assistant would zoom in from out of nowhere on their killing machine. . . . Once you were spotted there was no time to hide—it didn’t matter whether you were in the process of climbing or just near the wall and getting ready. It took him only seconds from the time he eyed you until the moment he murdered you with a spray of bullets. . . . If you were a smuggler, you were terrified of him. But you had no choice. You had to eat. (Klajman 2000, pp. 21–22)

In an attempt to alleviate the suffering as much as possible, ghetto residents developed a number of self-help organizations that provided vital services such as soup kitchens. These organizations were at first supported by funds from the American Joint Distribution Committee and were kept going by donations from relatively solvent ghetto Jews when contributions from Americans fell off as the United States entered World War II (Gutman 1982). Other examples of social organization in the ghetto included clandestine schools, religious services, and political organizations. The latter developed an extensive underground network and used soup kitchens and other self-help organizations to hold secret meetings, as political meetings were prohibited by Nazi decree (Gutman 1982, 1994; D. Kurzman 1993).

As time went on, however, the situation became more dire. By May 30, 1941, an estimated 50% of the Jews in the ghetto were starving to death, and there were 5,500 deaths in July 1941 alone, compared with only 454 deaths among Warsaw Jews in May 1938 (Ainsztein 1979, pp. 2–3). Yet the way that ghetto residents reacted to their circumstances is notable. Despite their suffering, there is evidence that many Warsaw Jews

⁶ Some ghetto residents actually found smuggling to be quite lucrative. Smugglers who catered to the interests of relatively wealthy residents (i.e., those who had been well off before the war and who managed to hold on to their valuables) grew wealthy themselves by bringing liquor and gourmet foods into the ghetto and selling them at black market prices (Donat 1978; Gutman 1982).

⁷ “Frankenstein,” whose name was Josef Blösche, was notorious in the ghetto and was mentioned in many memoirs and secondary sources.

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remained hopeful that the Nazis would lose the war and that life would return to normal (Gutman 1994). For example, the diary of Chaim Kaplan, a nearly daily account of life in the ghetto until its author perished in August 1942, repeatedly describes the community's belief that the Nazis would ultimately fall. On June 7, 1942, Kaplan wrote:

The Nazi sword rests against our throats, wreaking havoc amongst us. But we were always a nation bound by hope—and so we shall remain. . . . The English radio, whose listeners endanger their lives,⁸ strengthens our hope. . . . Every word gives us courage; every small detail that points to any military weakness is carried through the length and breadth of the ghetto as though on eagles' wings, with even children talking about it. When the news doesn't tell us what we want to hear, we twist and turn it until it seems full of hints, clues, and secrets that support our views. . . . A stubborn people! (Kaplan 1999, p. 347)

Even as verifiable rumors of mass extermination of Jews elsewhere in Europe filtered into the ghetto, many maintained a stubborn optimism that it would not or could not happen to them. Describing the reaction to the news of a massacre in Vilna (a city northeast of Warsaw, in modern-day Lithuania) in late December 1941, for example, one resident's memoirs note, "People consoled themselves with the thought that the Eastern districts were recognized as Russian territory, but other laws prevailed in the General Government and that Jews in this part of Poland would therefore be saved. Many believed that it would be impossible to exterminate the half a million people of the Warsaw Ghetto. . . . It was self-deceit, to be sure, but how could it have been otherwise?" (Wdowinski 1985, pp. 53–54). Similarly, Marek Edelman, one of the leaders of the Ghetto Uprising, wrote, "The Warsaw ghetto did not believe in the reports. All who clung to life would not believe that their lives could be taken from them in such a manner" (quoted in Ainsztein 1979, pp. 17–18).

Ironically, while such attitudes may have helped Warsaw Jews cope with life in the ghetto, they also prevented collective resistance from occurring. That is, as long as survival was a matter of enduring the ghetto conditions—dire as they were—until Germany lost the war, collective resistance was seen as unnecessary (Ainsztein 1979). In his memoirs, Stanislaw Adler, a member of the Jewish police in the ghetto,⁹ wrote,

⁸ Owning and operating radios at this time was illegal, for Jews and all Poles (Gutman 1982, p. 31).

⁹ A Jewish police force was created in the ghetto and operated as part of the Judenrat (Jewish Council), a Nazi-decreed body that was charged with carrying out the orders of the German authorities (Gutman 1982, p. 36).

The Jewish population had two choices: to engage in a heroic fight irrespective of the outcome and without any chance for even partial success, or to engage in a terrible race with time, a race which seemed to give some hope of survival. The kind of heroism required by the first choice *nobody* in the whole world would attempt as long as one spark of hope existed that they could last out. The overwhelming majority was overcome with an immense desire not so much to endure to the end of the war as to see with their own eyes the Nazis collapse. The community as a whole ardently and fanatically believed that this would happen though no logic could justify such a belief. . . . Therefore, this community, whose pre-war condition had compelled them to constant compromises and deprivations, persisted in their will to outlive this trial. (Adler 1982, p. 80; emphasis in original)

In order for collective resistance to emerge, then, Jews' perception of their situation had to change. The events of the summer of 1942 were transformative in this regard.

The Great Deportation, July–September 1942

On July 22, 1942, Germans began mass deportations in the Warsaw Ghetto, sending several thousand Jews to Treblinka every day for a period of six weeks. In response, many in the ghetto scrambled to protect themselves by finding employment in German-operated factories. Ghetto resident Alexander Donat wrote, "Everyone in the Ghetto frantically set about getting papers to prove employment. . . . Instead of saying 'Hello' or 'How are you?' people now greeted each other with 'Are you covered?'" (1978, p. 58). The memoirs of Vladka Meed, who became a courier for the ghetto fighters, also describe the mood at the time: "People exchanged reassuring words, perhaps seeking to delude themselves as much as to console one another. The clouds would yet disperse. . . . It was necessary to find work, to obtain an employment card; then, according to the German edict, one could be sure of being permitted to stay in the ghetto. The ghetto put its trust in the printed word; workers would not be deported. Life might be hard, but still bearable" (1979, p. 15).

Even once the mass deportations began, therefore, some people still had false hope that they would survive because they had proper papers; others held fast to the thought that deportation simply meant being sent to a work camp. The latter view was perpetuated by rumors, as well as by Nazi propaganda in the form of letters and postcards from people claiming to have been deported to work camps—letters that victims were forced to write before being put to death (Gutman 1982; Syrkin 1948). As the *aktion* (operation) progressed, however, hopes for survival were dashed. Kaplan's diary entry of August 2, 1942, began, "Jewish Warsaw is in its death throes. A whole community is going to its death!" (1999, p. 396). Donat's memoirs point to the deportation of Janusz Korczak, a

renowned pediatrician and children's advocate who established an orphanage in the ghetto, as the clearest evidence that everyone in the ghetto would eventually be killed. Korczak was sent to Treblinka along with 200 children from his orphanage on August 5, 1942, despite attempts by community leaders to save him. Donat wrote, "Why had the *Judenrat* [Jewish council] tried to save Korczak? If the two hundred children were really going to be resettled somewhere in the East, wasn't it perfectly natural for their teacher and shepherd to go along with them? What we had suspected all along—but could not or did not want to believe—was now confirmed. . . . This was not resettlement; this was deportation to death" (1978, p. 71).

The Emergence of Resistance

The events of the summer of 1942 were therefore instrumental in changing Warsaw Jews' assessment of their situation from one in which survival was possible to a growing awareness of the Nazis' genocidal plans. Still, resistance was not a foregone conclusion. While many in the ghetto—notably, young activists from a variety of political organizations—began to call for resistance, others believed that collective action was too risky and could make the Jews' situation even worse by increasing Nazi repression.

Exchanges at a meeting held on July 24, 1942, two days after the beginning of the mass deportations, illustrated these conflicting views. Among those present was Hirsch Berlinski, a member of the youth Zionist organization Left Poa'lei Zion. Berlinski argued for collective resistance: "In one way or another, deportation means annihilation. It is therefore better to die with dignity and not like hunted animals. There is no other way out, all that remains to us is to fight. . . . We realize that our armament compared with that of the enemy reminds one of a fly facing an elephant. But we have no alternative—annihilation faces us in one form or another" (quoted in Ainsztein 1979, p. 36). According to Berlinski's diary, his comments drew the following responses from older ghetto leaders (quoted in Ainsztein 1979, p. 37). Dr. Isaac Schipper, a historian and Zionist leader, said, "To defend ourselves is tantamount to bringing annihilation upon the ghetto," while Rabbi Zysie Frydman, the leader of the orthodox group Agudath Israel, said further, "I believe in God and I believe that a miracle will take place. The Lord will not allow His people to be annihilated. We must wait, we must wait for a miracle. To fight the Germans does not make sense. The Germans will wipe us out in a couple of days. . . . Dear friends, persevere and have faith and we shall be rescued!"

Although the views of the ghetto elders prevailed at that meeting, as

the *aktion* continued throughout the summer, more people began to support views such as Berlinski's. A new mood therefore took hold in the ghetto: since death was a certainty, it was better for Jews to die in battle with the Nazis than to submit meekly to being slaughtered (Gutman 1982, 1994). By the end of September 1942, two organizations emerged that were dedicated to armed resistance: the Jewish Fighting Organization (*Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa*), or *ŻOB*, and the Jewish Military Union (*Żydowski Związek Wojskowy*), or *ŻZW*. Each formed from the ghetto's network of activist youth. Activists from a variety of Zionist and socialist youth groups such as the Bund, Hashomer Hatza'ir ("The Young Guard"), and Dror ("Freedom") joined the *ŻOB* (see Zuckerman [1993, pp. xvii–xviii] for a description of these and other organizations), while the right-wing Betari Youth of the Revisionist Movement established the *ŻZW* (Wdowinski 1985).

Once formed, each organization set out to amass the weapons necessary for armed resistance. Those activists whose "good" (i.e., non-Semitic) looks and unaccented Polish allowed them to pass as Gentiles slipped out of the ghetto to try to obtain arms, while those who could not leave safely stayed behind to plan and train for resistance. However, even those who managed to cross safely to the Aryan side were still in danger, not simply because of their arms-smuggling activities, but because any Jew caught outside the ghetto was put to death. Jews working outside the ghetto were particularly fearful of blackmailers (*shmaltsovniks*) who extorted fees from Jews in exchange for not turning them in to the Gestapo (Rotem 1994; Zuckerman 1993). Arms were also quite expensive. Ringelblum noted that the ghetto fighters had to pay three times the going rate for arms because of the risks that Polish arms smugglers took if caught helping Jews (Kermish 1986, p. 597n4; see also Ainsztein 1979, p. 68). To raise the necessary funds, members of the fighting organizations turned to those few remaining ghetto residents who were known to have valuables (mostly smugglers and members of the Jewish police). While some of these individuals voluntarily donated money to the resistance efforts, others did not; in such cases, *ŻOB* and *ŻZW* members exacted taxes and used force in order to get the desperately needed funds (Gutman 1982). *ŻOB* fighter Tuvia Borzykowski wrote in his memoirs, "Our enforcement bodies were particularly severe towards members of the Jewish police,¹⁰ whom we taxed extra heavily. The policemen were among the richest Jews in the ghetto because they appropriated much property left by Jews who fell victim to the German extermination actions. Many were arrested for not responding to the demands of the tax collectors; there was even one case

¹⁰ The Jewish police were hated throughout the ghetto for their participation in round-ups (Gutman 1994, p. 143).

when a Jewish policeman was shot when resisting fighters who came to collect money” (1976, p. 38).

By January 1943, the ŻOB had obtained only a few grenades and a few dozen pistols (Ainsztein 1979), yet by the start of the April 1943 uprising, each of the ŻOB’s roughly 500 fighters had a pistol and a few homemade hand grenades, while the estimated 400 members of the ŻZW had pistols and grenades, as well as 21 submachine guns, eight machine guns, and 30 rifles (Ainsztein 1979, pp. 97–98; Gutman 1982, pp. 344, 348). Given the conditions under which they were amassed, these arsenals were certainly impressive; still, they were hardly enough to fight effectively against the much better armed SS troops. Thus, as Syrkin notes (1948, p. 203), “The Jewish fighters were rich only in daring and the readiness to sell their lives dearly.”

EXPLAINING ARMED RESISTANCE IN THE GHETTO: OPPORTUNITY, THREAT, AND HONOR

By the end of May 1943, the Warsaw Ghetto lay in ruins. The rebellion led by the ŻOB and ŻZW was crushed, and most of the ghetto residents were either deported to the death camps or killed in the fighting and subsequent razing of the ghetto by German troops. This outcome is hardly surprising, as the poorly outfitted ghetto fighters were no match for their opponents. What *is* surprising—especially from the perspective of opportunity-based explanations for collective action—is the fact that they staged armed resistance in the first place. Below, I assess political opportunity, both real and perceived, in the Warsaw Ghetto. I then argue that the lack of opportunity—or, better, the extreme threat—helped usher in a new set of interpretations among the ghetto fighters; namely, that resistance would lead to a certain death, but one that was honorable. Finally, by treating honor as a motivational frame (Benford 1993; Snow and Benford 1988), I discuss why the concept of honor became a compelling argument for resistance and show how opportunity and honor worked together to facilitate collective action.

Opportunity and Threat

Tilly (1978) argues that multiple sovereignty, or a situation in which more than one political bloc makes exclusive claims upon the government, may create opportunity for collective action. While multiple governing bodies existed in the ghetto (e.g., the Judenrat and Jewish police), most of these were established by the Germans themselves and therefore had little power to make claims. Instead of providing Jews with protection, these

self-governance bodies actually facilitated Nazi repression by putting into place a set of procedures for compliance with Nazi edicts (Gutman 1982). The ghetto fighters also lacked assistance from third parties. Although a Polish underground existed on the Aryan side, few groups were willing to do much to assist the ghetto Jews, despite numerous pleas (Ainsztein 1979; Gutman 1982; D. Kurzman 1993). Some groups such as the Polish *Armia Krajowa* (Home Army) did supply some arms to the ghetto fighters, but this aid was limited;¹¹ in fact, one shipment of 10 revolvers in December 1942 was mostly defective (Gutman 1982, p. 300). D. Kurzman (1993) also suggests that the *Armia Krajowa* and Polish government-in-exile in London were hesitant to help the ghetto Jews for fear of losing support among the openly anti-Semitic Polish population. Nor did Germany's commitment to warmaking activity create opportunity for resistance in the ghetto. For instance, although Germany extended its involvement in World War II with the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, that invasion coincided with the systematic implementation of the "Final Solution" (Browning 1992; Gutman 1982, 1989*b*), which signaled increased repression and a further erosion of what little control European Jews had over their lives. Warsaw Jews therefore experienced none of the "openings" argued by many theorists to pave the way for the emergence of collective action. Indeed, since they lacked all rights of citizenship (Gutman 1982), Warsaw Jews were in no position to benefit from any shifts in the political system, even if such shifts had occurred.

Further, Jews' perceptions of their situation matched the structural reality. Whereas in the early months of the ghetto many Jews may have perceived opportunity to exist—in the form of an eventually weakened Nazi Germany that would lose the war—by the time of the uprising, there is no evidence that they believed that the Germans were weakening or that Allied forces would come to their rescue. Instead, people came to realize that everyone in the ghetto would eventually be targeted for death. As Kaplan's diary entry on July 11, 1942, read, "As long as there is no knowledge, hope still flows in the heart, but from now on everything is clear, and all doubt of our future is removed" (1999, p. 371).

It is incorrect, however, to view the uprising as an attempt on the part of the fighters to save their own lives.¹² Certainly, none of the ghetto

¹¹ Stronger ties to the Polish underground gave the ŻZW access to more arms; in contrast, the ŻOB had to rely more on homemade explosives (D. Kurzman 1993).

¹² Members of the ŻOB did try to save lives, such as by obtaining forged identification papers and safe houses on the Aryan side for Jewish children (Meed 1979); however, the fighters did not plan to save their own lives. In fact, the ŻOB did not build its own bunker but planned to fight to the death instead (D. Kurzman 1993, p. 45). As ŻOB fighter Simha Rotem (aka "Kazik") explained in his memoirs, for the ŻOB to build a bunker would have been "counter to its purpose" (Rotem 1994, p. 38).

fighters expected to beat the Nazis in battle; D. Kurzman (1993, p. 52) quotes a ŻOB fighter who described the plans for resistance as “the most hopeless declaration of war that has ever been made.” It is also apparent that none even expected to survive the battle. Commenting on a conversation with ŻOB Commander Mordechai Anielewicz, Emmanuel Ringelblum wrote, “He gave an accurate appraisal of the chances of the uneven struggle, he foresaw the destruction of the Ghetto and the workshop, and he was sure that neither he nor his combatants would survive the liquidation of the Ghetto. He was sure that they would die like stray dogs and no one would even know their last resting place” (Kermish 1986, p. 600).

This pessimism was especially true before the January uprising, when the shortage of weapons and uncertainty about the fighters’ battle readiness was most acute. In his memoirs, ŻOB leader Yitzhak Zuckerman described the fighters as “novices” and rued the lack of weapons: “As January approached . . . there were very few weapons. We didn’t delude ourselves, nor did we ignore the fact that the great majority of the Jews had already been taken and killed, and only a few score thousand were left. Nor did we think the Germans would be satisfied with that” (1993, p. 278). Even though they had more weapons by April, the ghetto fighters still realized that they were outarmed. ŻOB fighter Simha Rotem’s memoirs recount his reaction to seeing German troops amass in the ghetto at the start of the April fighting: “At 4 in the morning, we saw at the Nalewki Passage a line of Nazis marching to the Central Ghetto. They walked and walked endlessly. There were a few thousand of them. . . . Suddenly I felt how very weak we were. What were we and what was our strength against an armed and well-equipped army, against tanks and armored vehicles, while we had only pistols and at most grenades?” (1994, p. 156).

By the time resistance emerged in the ghetto, then, opportunity—both structural and perceived—was severely restricted. Targeted for death by a powerful army and lacking both rights of citizenship and meaningful assistance from third parties, the ghetto fighters saw their situation as a hopeless one in which death was certain, whether they resisted or not.¹³ Such perceptions more accurately may be thought of as perceptions of threat rather than of opportunity, in the sense that the residents foresaw conditions of extreme danger. Yet this situation actually facilitated collective action, because it was only when the ghetto Jews were convinced that their deaths were inevitable that they began to plan for resistance. As Gutman (1994, p. 165) notes, “Hopelessness was a prerequisite for resistance.”

¹³ Even though the January uprising lifted spirits somewhat, death was still the expected conclusion (Borzykowski 1976; Rotem 1994; Zuckerman 1993).

Honor

Such assessments alone did not produce resistance, however. Accompanying this “attribution of threat” (McAdam et al. 2001) was the way that the ghetto fighters framed the resistance itself: as a way to display their honor and dignity by choosing the way they would die. As Emmanuel Ringelblum wrote in October 1942, after the Great Deportation had ended:

The Jewish public understood what a terrible error had been made by not offering resistance to the SS. It was argued that if on the day the Warsaw “resettlement action” was announced, everyone had rebelled, if the Germans had been attacked with knives, sticks, spades, and axes, if hydrochloric acid, melted tar, boiling water, etc., had been poured over the Germans, Ukrainians, Latvians, and Jewish Order Service, in short if men, women and children, young and old, had begun a mass rising, there would not have been three hundred and fifty thousand murdered in Treblinka, but only fifty thousand shot in the streets of the capital. . . . Oaths were sworn aloud: Never again shall the Germans move us from here with impunity; we shall die, but the cruel invaders will pay with their blood for ours. Our fate is sealed, people were saying. Every Jew carries a death sentence in his pocket, handed him by the greatest murderer of all time. Thus we must think not so much of saving our lives, which seems to be a very problematic affair, but rather of dying an honourable death, dying with weapons in our hands. (Quoted in Kermish 1986, pp. 594–95)

The main goal of the resistance, therefore, was not necessarily to beat the SS troops and secure safe passage out of the ghetto. Instead, it was to act honorably. For example, when describing the uprising to an interviewer, ŻOB leader Marek Edelman noted one instance in which he and his fighters shot at some German soldiers and missed them, saying, “We missed but it doesn’t matter.” When the interviewer asked him to explain, he replied, “The important thing was just that we were shooting. We had to show it. Not to the Germans. They knew better than us how to shoot. We had to show it to this other, the non-German world. People have always thought that shooting is the highest form of heroism. So we were shooting” (quoted in Krall 1986, p. 3).

Further, by dying in battle, the ghetto fighters would preserve not only their own honor, but also the dignity and honor of the Jewish people as a whole (Cochavi 1995). A notice posted by the ŻOB on April 18, 1943, the day before the April uprising began, made this goal clear; it read, “To fight, to die, for the honor of our people!” (D. Kurzman 1993, p. 92). Similarly, ŻOB fighter Hirsch Berlinski wrote in his diary, “By acting in this manner we shall show the world that we stood up to the enemy, that we did not go passively to our slaughter. Let our desperate act be a protest flung into the face of the world, which has reacted so feebly against the

crimes committed by the Nazis against hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews” (quoted in Ainsztein 1979, pp. 36–37).

Honor as a Motivational Frame

The concept of honor itself—and why an honorable resistance was compelling—deserves more explanation. Honor may be described both individually and socially; the term refers both to an individual’s personal qualities and to his or her reputation in the eyes of others (Baxter and Margavio 2000; Stewart 1994). Stewart (1994, p. 21) also describes honor in terms of a right to respect, or “to be treated as having a certain worth.” A variety of studies have explored the role of honor in social interaction. For example, studies of urban youth gangs (Bourgois 1995; Horowitz 1983) note the central role of honor as a guide for both legal and illegal activities. Much of this work examines how adherence to honor codes often leads to violence, especially when a person or group’s honor is questioned or threatened. Similarly, Baxter and Margavio (2000) argue that honor regulates the use of aggression in economic exchange.

In light of such work, it makes a certain amount of sense that the ghetto fighters turned to armed resistance as a means of regaining the respect that had been denied them during Nazi occupation. Further, it is perhaps not surprising that the idea of resisting in order to die honorably originated with the young Zionists who were among the founders of the ŻOB and the ŻZW, since the Zionist movement in the 1930s and 1940s put forth a “new image” of Jews as strong and capable of self-defense (Cochavi 1995; Syrkin 1948). As noted earlier, joining the Zionists were also a number of young activists from Jewish workers’ organizations, such as the Bund; despite their political differences from the others on the topic of Zionism, these individuals also supported the idea of resistance against their oppressors (Cochavi 1995; Gutman 1982, 1994). Eventually, the idea of dying honorably was adopted by nonactivist segments of the ghetto population as well. Klajman’s memoirs note, “Perhaps the devastation of the Aktion was the final straw, but people in the ghetto finally realized death was certain to come sooner or later, and that there was nothing to lose by resisting. With no fear of death, we were energized to fight to the best of our abilities. Everyone knew the chance of victory was zero, but winning wasn’t the goal. We just wanted to die with dignity” (2000, pp. 61–62). Similarly, Bauman’s diary entry from November 2, 1942, read, “They say, ‘Fight.’ Yes, of course, it’s the only way, though there won’t be much chance of survival if we do. But what else can we do? There is something called ‘dignity,’ much forgotten these days. Yes, I’m ready to join at once. . . . I’ve been trying to find out the people behind those three letters [ŻZW]” (1986, p. 84).

Honor—and the notion that aggression is the appropriate response when honor is threatened—may therefore be thought of as part of the “vocabularies of motive” (Benford 1993; Snow and Benford 1988) that compelled resistance in the ghetto. According to Benford (1993, p. 200), such “vocabularies” consist of “rationales and justifications . . . [that] provide participants with ‘good reasons’ for identifying with the tools and values of the movement and for taking action on its behalf.” Specifically, framing resistance as honorable in this case illustrates the motivational vocabulary of “propriety,” or frames that cast the movement’s issues in terms of participants’ moral duty and ethical responsibilities to themselves and their communities (Benford 1993, p. 207). These themes are particularly evident in ŻOB fighter Zivia Lubetkin’s account of the call to resistance: “We said to ourselves: ‘We must see the truth for what it is. The Germans want to annihilate us. It is our duty to organize ourselves for defense, and struggle for our honor and the honor of the Jewish people.’ . . . This conviction was the motivating force behind our self-defense, our approaching battle” (1981, p. 91).

Work on the role of identity and emotion in social movements suggests that the motivational force of a frame that cast resistance as honorable also drew its power from its emotional content and explicit reference to the Jewish community. Following the basic premises of new social movement theory (Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; Melucci 1989), a large literature has emerged on identity, which is argued to lie at the heart of protest activity (see Polletta and Jasper [2001] for a review). Thus, framing their resistance as a fight for honor may have been compelling because, by doing so, the ghetto fighters made a statement about who and what Warsaw Jews were: strong and proud people, not the weak “subhumans” portrayed by Nazi ideology. Resistance was therefore the enactment of an identity (Calhoun 1991; Neuhauser 1998). Perhaps more important, the statement stood not simply for the Warsaw Ghetto fighters, but for the Jewish people as a whole. Writing about resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto, Cochavi notes, “A process of increasing openness and sympathy began to unfold in regard to the Jewish community at large, and the acceptance of responsibility for its condition and fate, a responsibility which included within its scope also the question of the way in which this same community should face its destruction. The call to rebellion was an expression, too, of the sense of responsibility for the public image of a community to which the members of the youth movement regarded themselves as being committed” (1995, p. 251). Finally, the commitment and responsibility noted in the quote above also suggests that emotions (see Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001) may help explain the motivational capability of an honor-based frame. That is, honor may have emerged as the mobilizing frame not only because of its statement about

the fighters themselves, but also because of the strong feelings of solidarity and emotional ties between the ghetto fighters and the broader community that they believed themselves to represent.

Honor, Motivational Framing, and the Attribution of Threat

Again, however, it is important to remember that resistance did not emerge until well after Warsaw Jews were confined to the ghetto and subjected to humiliating treatment. In other words, despite the motivational force of an honor-based frame, the timing of the resistance cannot be explained simply as a response to dishonor. Instead, the use of honor as a motivational frame combined with the attribution of threat to produce resistance. Indeed, framing resistance as honorable became compelling in part because the ghetto fighters were certain they would die. As Zivia Lubetkin wrote, “We all desired a different death, a death which would bring vengeance upon the enemy and restore the honor of our people” (1981, p. 123).¹⁴

The desperate situation in which the ghetto residents were placed—and of which they eventually became aware—therefore created a context in which an honor-based frame motivated collective action. A combination of structural constraints and interpretive processes framing action in terms of honor and dignity has been used to explain collective action in other severely restricted contexts. For instance, Loveman (1998) argues that high-risk human rights activism in repressive Latin American countries can be explained in part by identity processes set in motion by the threat posed by such activism. She quotes one Chilean activist who participated out of a strong sense of personal duty to those who were suffering: “For me, the suffering of the people I was helping was intolerable. . . . I believe that one commits oneself to things because of who one is. I believe that I would have lost my own dignity and self-respect if I hadn’t done the work I did” (p. 492). Wood’s (2001) analysis of peasant participation in the Salvadoran opposition movement in the mid-1970s provides a similar example: as she explains, participation gave the peasants a chance to assert their dignity and pride and therefore provided “emotional benefits” that helped offset the high risks of collective action (see also Calhoun 1991; Neuhauser 1998).

I do not suggest that it was the *risk* of death that made armed resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto honorable or compelling, however. Other scholars (Goodwin and Pfaff 2001; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1986) use the term “high-risk activism” to refer to those situations where protest participants

¹⁴ By emphasizing vengeance (and not simply resistance), Lubetkin’s quote also suggests that there was more than one way to attain honor.

risk beatings, torture, and even death for their activities, and they argue that the dynamics of high-risk activism require different explanations than do other forms of collective action. While the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising may be thought of as a case of high-risk activism (Einwohner 2003), what distinguishes this case from others is not simply that the ghetto fighters risked death, but that they believed they were *certain* to die; further, they felt that they would die *regardless of their decision to resist*. This assessment of their situation—and the process by which it emerged—helps make the interaction between opportunity, attribution of threat, and motivational framing particularly clear. If Warsaw Jews had the option of either resisting or continuing to live in the ghetto under German occupation, perhaps the uprising would not have taken place; indeed, the fact that no collective resistance took place before July 1942 supports this conclusion. Yet with an attribution of threat so great that they believed their deaths to be inevitable, resistance—framed in terms of an honorable death—became preferred.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising represents important evidence that European Jews did not always submit meekly to Nazi aggression. However, Warsaw Jews' decision to stage resistance runs counter to what opportunity-based explanations of social movement emergence would predict. Instead of responding to opportunity, these activists resisted despite a lack of opportunity—and, more precisely, *because* they lacked opportunity. A lack of opportunity, both structural and perceived, and an attribution of threat facilitated the emergence of a motivational frame that cast resistance as honorable. This frame was compelling because it spoke to the propriety of collective action and promoted a positive collective identity.

This analysis has several implications for social movement research. First, it demonstrates that collective action can emerge in the absence of any favorable shifts or “openings” in the political system. It therefore corroborates other studies that have also identified cases of collective action emerging in severely restricted contexts, including the Iranian revolution (Kurzman 1996) and activism in Latin America (Loveman 1998; Wood 2001). However, it goes beyond previous research on collective action in repressive contexts, some of which suggests that protesters may create their own opportunity—either real or perceived—where none exists. C. Kurzman (1996, p. 165) uses the analogy of a door to make this point clear: whereas classical treatments of opportunity and collective action explain action in terms of “doors” that “open” and allow protest to take place, his analysis indicates that protesters are also able to open doors

themselves. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising suggests another possibility: protest can take place outside a closed door (even one that is bolted shut).

This analysis also helps build a body of research that can begin to identify those contingencies that determine whether opportunity-based explanations can account for collective action (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). At first glance, one such condition would seem to be the presence of a democratic political system, in which citizens are afforded certain rights (e.g., the right to vote and to peacefully assemble) that help them take advantage of structural opportunities that arise. Indeed, some scholars have already begun to suggest that political process theory is better suited to explain the cases from which it has been derived—that is, protest in contemporary Western democracies—rather than protest more generally (McAdam et al. 2001). However, given that the notion of political opportunity has also been used to explain collective action in nondemocratic contexts (e.g., C. Kurzman 1996; Skocpol 1979), the presence of a democracy is not a necessary condition for the theory to apply. Still, this case is useful in pointing to other contingencies—here, not simply a lack of democracy but a situation of utter powerlessness in which the insurgents had no voice, no supportive third parties, and no legitimate claims vis-à-vis the governing authorities, including claims on their own lives. It was in the context of widespread, systematic genocide that resistance in the ghetto made sense. Genocide is therefore one historically specific factor that can mediate the effect of opportunity (or threat) on the emergence of collective action. Other cases of collective action in situations of extreme powerlessness, such as uprisings in refugee camps, slave rebellions, and prison revolts, may operate similarly (although see Goldstone and Useem [1999] for an application of opportunity-based explanations to prison riots). More research is therefore needed on a variety of cases of protest and resistance to continue to specify the conditions under which opportunity-based explanations apply best.

Finally, there are some who would argue that it is inappropriate to apply social movement theory to a case like the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising—a case that appears to be quite different from what scholars would recognize as protest or a social movement in contemporary society. Yet it is precisely because this case is so different that it is important to apply our theories to it. This analysis therefore reiterates calls made by other scholars (Goldstone and Useem 1999; Meyer 2002) who suggest that it is fruitful to apply extant theories to a wider range of cases than commonly studied. Broadening our inquiries beyond “social movements” to include a host of different examples of “contentious politics” (McAdam et al. 2001) can identify the need for additional theoretical development. Continued research on resistance in dire situations such as genocide and slavery,

where insurgents face utter powerlessness and hopelessness, will further these objectives considerably.

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